Introduction to Meta-Ethics

This unit moves from Normative Ethics (which asks "What actions are right/wrong?") to Meta-Ethics.

Meta-ethics does not prescribe any moral actions. It asks foundational questions about the nature of morality itself:

• Meaning: What is the meaning of moral terms like 'good', 'right', 'wrong'?
• Ontology: Do moral truths exist? Are they objective?
• Epistemology: How do we know what is right and wrong?

The theories in this unit are Non-Cognitivist (Emotivism) or Non-Naturalist (Moore).

• Cognitivism: Moral statements express beliefs and can be true or false.
• Non-Cognitivism: Moral statements are *not* beliefs and are *not* true or false. They do something else, like express emotions.

G. E. Moore: Indefinibility of 'Good' (Intuitionism)

G. E. Moore (1873-1958), in his book Principia Ethica, tackled the first question of meta-ethics: "What is 'good'?"

His answer was that 'good' is indefinable.

• 'Good' is a simple property: Moore argued that 'good' is a simple, non-natural property, like the color 'yellow'.
• The Analogy of 'Yellow':
  • You cannot *define* 'yellow'. You can't explain it to a blind person.
  • You can't break 'yellow' down into simpler parts. It is just 'yellow'.
  • You can only *show* it by pointing to yellow things (a lemon, a sunflower) and saying "That is yellow."
• Similarly, 'good' is a simple concept. You can't define it. You can only point to good *things* (e.g., "honesty is good").

Ethical Intuitionism

If 'good' is indefinable, how do we know what is good?
Moore's answer is Ethical Intuitionism. We come to know 'good' (a non-natural property) through a special faculty of moral intuition, similar to how we know 'yellow' (a natural property) through our faculty of sight.