Unit 4: Meta-Ethics (Moore, Ayer, Stevenson)
Introduction to Meta-Ethics
This unit moves from Normative Ethics (which asks "What actions are right/wrong?") to Meta-Ethics.
Meta-ethics does not prescribe any moral actions. It asks foundational questions about the nature of morality itself:
- Meaning: What is the meaning of moral terms like 'good', 'right', 'wrong'?
- Ontology: Do moral truths exist? Are they objective?
- Epistemology: How do we know what is right and wrong?
The theories in this unit are Non-Cognitivist (Emotivism) or Non-Naturalist (Moore).
- Cognitivism: Moral statements express beliefs and can be true or false.
- Non-Cognitivism: Moral statements are *not* beliefs and are *not* true or false. They do something else, like express emotions.
G. E. Moore: Indefinibility of 'Good' (Intuitionism)
G. E. Moore (1873-1958), in his book Principia Ethica, tackled the first question of meta-ethics: "What is 'good'?"
His answer was that 'good' is indefinable.
- 'Good' is a simple property: Moore argued that 'good' is a simple, non-natural property, like the color 'yellow'.
- The Analogy of 'Yellow':
- You cannot *define* 'yellow'. You can't explain it to a blind person.
- You can't break 'yellow' down into simpler parts. It is just 'yellow'.
- You can only *show* it by pointing to yellow things (a lemon, a sunflower) and saying "That is yellow."
- Similarly, 'good' is a simple concept. You can't define it. You can only point to good *things* (e.g., "honesty is good").
Ethical Intuitionism
If 'good' is indefinable, how do we know what is good?
Moore's answer is Ethical Intuitionism. We come to know 'good' (a non-natural property) through a special faculty of moral intuition, similar to how we know 'yellow' (a natural property) through our faculty of sight.
G. E. Moore: The Naturalistic Fallacy
The Naturalistic Fallacy is the central error that Moore claimed almost all other ethical theorists (like Mill) had committed.
Definition: The Naturalistic Fallacy is the error of defining 'good' (a non-natural property) in terms of some other natural property (like 'pleasure', 'survival', or 'what God wills').
- Example 1 (Bentham/Mill): They define "Good" as "pleasure." This is a fallacy.
- Example 2 (Social Darwinists): They define "Good" as "what is more evolved." This is a fallacy.
The Open Question Argument
Moore used this argument to prove *why* it's a fallacy.
- Take any proposed natural definition: "Good means pleasure."
- Now, ask a question: "I know that X is pleasurable, but is it good?"
- This question is "open"—it is an intelligible, meaningful question.
- If "good" *really* meant "pleasure," the question would be silly. It would be like asking "I know X is pleasurable, but is it pleasurable?" (which is a closed, nonsensical question).
- Since the question "Is pleasure good?" is always a meaningful, open question, "good" and "pleasure" cannot mean the same thing.
Therefore, any attempt to define 'good' in terms of something else will always fail the Open Question Argument. 'Good' is just 'good', and it is indefinable.
Ayer and Stevenson: Emotivism
Emotivism is a Non-Cognitivist meta-ethical theory. It agrees with Moore that 'good' can't be defined, but for a very different reason. It argues that moral statements aren't just indefinable—they are cognitively meaningless.
A. J. Ayer: The "Boo/Hurrah" Theory
A. J. Ayer (1910-1989) was a Logical Positivist. He believed that for a statement to be meaningful, it must be one of two things:
- Analytic: True by definition (e.g., "All bachelors are unmarried").
- Synthetic: Verifiable through sense-experience (e.g., "There is a chair in this room").
Ayer looked at moral statements like "Stealing is wrong."
- It's not analytic (it's not true by definition).
- It's not synthetic (you can't "see" or "touch" the "wrongness" of stealing).
- Therefore, moral statements are cognitively meaningless. They are not propositions that can be true or false.
So, what are we doing when we say "Stealing is wrong"?
Ayer's Answer: We are simply expressing our emotion (evincing) and trying to arouse that emotion in others.
- "Stealing is wrong!" just means "Stealing... BOO!"
- "Honesty is good!" just means "Honesty... HURRAH!"
- This is why Emotivism is often called the "Boo/Hurrah Theory."
C. L. Stevenson: Refined Emotivism
C. L. Stevenson (1908-1979) agreed with Ayer but thought his model was too simple. Stevenson's Emotivism has two components:
- Expressive Component: Like Ayer, moral statements express the speaker's feelings. "This is good" = "I approve of this."
- Persuasive (Dynamic) Component: This is the new part. Moral statements are also used to influence or persuade the listener. "This is good" also means "...and you should approve of it too!"
For Stevenson, moral disagreements are not disagreements about *facts* (like in science), but disagreements in *attitude*. The purpose of moral argument is to change the other person's attitude, not to prove them factually wrong.