FYUG Even Semester Exam, 2025
PHILOSOPHY (4th Semester)
Course No.: PHIDSC-252
[Classical Text: Indian]

Full Marks: 70 | Pass Marks: 28 | Time: 3 hours

UNIT-I

Question 1 (a) 2 Marks

Define Pramā. Can 'memory' be classified as Pramā?

Pramā is defined as "Yathārtha Anubhava," which means valid presentative knowledge or knowledge that represents an object as it truly is.

Memory: No, memory (Smriti) cannot be classified as Pramā in the Nyāya school. This is because memory is representative knowledge based on past impressions, whereas Pramā must be presentative (Anubhava).

Question 1 (b) 2 Marks

Define Apramā. How many kinds of Apramā are accepted by the Naiyāyikas?

Definition: Apramā is invalid knowledge (Ayathārtha Anubhava), where an object is perceived as something it is not.

Kinds: The Naiyāyikas accept three kinds of Apramā:

  • Samsaya (Doubt)
  • Viparyaya (Error)
  • Tarka (Hypothetical reasoning)

Question 1 (c) 2 Marks

How many Pramāņas are accepted by the Nyāya school? Name them.

The Nyāya school accepts four independent Pramāṇas (sources of valid knowledge):

  1. Pratyakṣa (Perception)
  2. Anumāna (Inference)
  3. Upamāna (Comparison)
  4. Śabda (Verbal Testimony)

Question 2 (a) 10 Marks

What is Saṁśaya (doubt)? Discuss the five kinds of Samsaya as accepted by Nyaya philosophy.

Definition: Saṁśaya is the state of mind where there is an oscillation between different conflicting attributes regarding the same object (e.g., "Is that a post or a man?").

Five Kinds of Samsaya:

  • Sādhāraṇa: Doubt arising from perceiving common qualities (e.g., seeing height and doubting if it's a pillar or a person).
  • Asādhāraṇa: Doubt arising from a unique quality not found elsewhere (e.g., sound is a quality of ether, but its eternity is doubted).
  • Vipratipatti: Doubt arising from conflicting testimony or contradictory views from different authorities.
  • Upalabdhi-avyavasthā: Doubt regarding the reality of an object when it is perceived in a way that is normally associated with non-existence (e.g., water in a mirage).
  • Anupalabdhi-avyavasthā: Doubt arising when an object is not perceived even though it should be.

Question 2 (b) (OR) 10 Marks

Write short notes on Viparyaya (error) and Tarka (hypothetical reasoning).

Viparyaya (Error): This is positive misapprehension or false knowledge. It occurs when we perceive an object and attribute to it characteristics it does not possess, such as seeing silver in a shell (Raupya-bhrama). Unlike doubt, error is a definite cognition, but it is incorrect.

Tarka (Hypothetical Reasoning): Tarka is an indirect method of validation. It is used to support a Pramāṇa by showing that the opposite of the conclusion would lead to an absurdity. For example, "If there were no fire, there would be no smoke." It is not a Pramāṇa itself but a "help" to Pramāṇa.

UNIT-II

Question 3 (a) 2 Marks

State Annambhatta's definition of Pratyaksa (perception).

Pratyakṣa is the knowledge produced by the contact of a sense-organ with an object (Indriyārtha sannikarṣa janyam jñānam).

Question 3 (b) 2 Marks

What, according to Nyaya school, is the Karana (specific cause) of Pratyaksa? How many types of sense-object contact are accepted?

Karana: The specific cause of perception is the sense-organ (Indriya).

Contacts: There are six types of ordinary sense-object contact (Laukika Sannikarṣa).

Question 4 (a) 10 Marks

What are the definitions of Savikalpaka and Nirvikalpaka Pratyaksa? Distinguish between them.

Nirvikalpaka (Indeterminate): The primary, non-judgmental stage where we perceive the existence of an object without its attributes or relations. Annambhatta defines it as "knowledge devoid of name and class."

Savikalpaka (Determinate): The second stage where the object is perceived with its name, genus, and attributes (e.g., "This is a man," "This is a jar").

Distinctions:

  • Nirvikalpaka is psychological and non-propositional; Savikalpaka is logical and propositional.
  • Nirvikalpaka is beyond "truth" or "falsity" (it's just a raw sensation), while Savikalpaka can be valid or invalid.
  • Nirvikalpaka is not expressible in words; Savikalpaka is verbally communicable.

UNIT-III

Question 5 (b) 2 Marks

What are the Avayavas of Anumana?

The five members (Avayavas) of a Nyāya syllogism are:

  1. Pratijñā (Proposition)
  2. Hetu (Reason)
  3. Udāharaṇa (Universal proposition with example)
  4. Upanaya (Application)
  5. Nigamana (Conclusion)

Question 6 (a) 10 Marks

How has Annambhatta defined Vyapti? Discuss its role in Anumiti.

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Definition: Vyāpti is defined as "Hetu-vyanāpaka-sādhya-samānādhikaraṇyam," which translates to the relation of invariable concomitance between the Hetu (middle term) and the Sādhya (major term).[span_45](end_span)

Role in Anumiti:

  • Anumiti (inferential knowledge) is impossible without the knowledge of Vyāpti.
  • It serves as the logical ground of inference; unless we know that "Wherever there is smoke, there is fire," we cannot infer fire from smoke.
  • It transforms a mere observation (smoke on the hill) into a valid conclusion (fire on the hill).

UNIT-IV

Question 7 (b) 2 Marks

What are the two kinds of Sabda as accepted by the Nyaya school?

  1. Dṛṣṭārtha: Verbal testimony relating to perceptible objects (e.g., statements of a reliable doctor).
  2. Adṛṣṭārtha: Verbal testimony relating to imperceptible objects (e.g., scriptural statements about heaven or liberation).

Question 8 (a) 10 Marks

Critically explain Upamāna as a distinct source of valid knowledge.

Definition: Upamāna is knowledge of the relation between a name and an object (Saṁjñā-saṁjñī sambandha) based on similarity.

The Process:

  • A person hears from an expert that a "Gavaya" (wild ox) looks like a cow.
  • The person goes to the forest, sees an animal similar to a cow, and remembers the description.
  • The resulting knowledge "This is a Gavaya" is the result of Upamāna.

Critical Examination: Other schools like Sāṁkhya and Vaiśeṣika reduce Upamāna to perception or inference. However, Nyāya maintains its distinctness because the knowledge generated is specifically about the naming relationship, which perception or inference alone cannot yield.

UNIT-V

Question 10 (b) 10 Marks

Explain with examples the different types of Hetvābhāsa (fallacies of inference).

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The Nyāya school identifies five types of fallacious reasons (Hetvābhāsa):[span_60](end_span)

  • Savyabhicāra: The reason is not exclusive to the major term (e.g., "Sound is eternal because it is knowable" — everything is knowable, even non-eternal things).
  • Viruddha: The reason actually contradicts the conclusion (e.g., "Sound is eternal because it is produced" — being produced implies being non-eternal).
  • Satpratipakṣa: There is another reason that proves the opposite (e.g., "Sound is eternal" vs "Sound is non-eternal").
  • Asiddha: The reason itself is unproved or non-existent (e.g., "Sky-lotus is fragrant because it is a lotus").
  • Bādhita: The conclusion is contradicted by a stronger Pramāṇa like perception (e.g., "Fire is cold because it is a substance" — perception proves fire is hot).